Directors and firm performance: evidence from British soccer corporations

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to analyze the importance of the interrelationship between directors and firm performance in UK soccer corporations. In doing so the analysis enriches the existing literature in corporate governance in several ways. The primary innovation contained in this thesis is that it analyses productivity performance in the field of corporate governance for the first time. My empirical analysis considers two distinctive elements of firm performance. The first element is productivity performance, which is measured by on-field football success that includes winning percentage, percentage of league points and attendance. To my knowledge, this has not been addressed elsewhere in the corporate governance research. The second element is financial performance, which is measured by off-field economic success which includes profitability and the ratio of turnover to total assets. Overall, the findings of this research suggest that productivity performance is the principle criterion used to judge corporate decision making. The first element of the empirical analysis examines determinants of directors’ remuneration under three categories, namely; board remuneration, executive remuneration and CEO remuneration. My main findings can be summarized as follows. Firstly, I find evidence that in all categories of directors’ remuneration productivity performance is the chief determinant; concomitantly, there is little evidence of a link between CEO remuneration and financial performance. Secondly, I document that directors’ remuneration is substantially affected by firm size and managerial ownership. Finally, I find that the proportion of non-executive directors significantly reduces board and executive compensation. The second empirical analysis investigates the determinants of executive turnover, through using multiple theoretical approaches. My analysis compares the relative importance of productivity compared to financial performance on executive turnover decisions. My main finding is that productivity performance is more important than financial performance in driving executive turnover. Furthermore, my analysis demonstrates that executive turnover is considerably influenced by managerial ownership and industry experience. Overall, my results suggest a stronger relationship between performance and turnover in listed corporations than in FA Premier League corporations. This implies that quoted firms adhere to corporate governance directives more than FA Premier League firms. The final empirical analysis investigates the impact of multiple directorships, ownership structure and managerial industry experience on productivity and financial performance. My main findings are as follows. First, the results reveal that directors with multiple directorships improve productivity performance by enhancing the firm’s net spending, this having the effect of worsening financial performance. Second, I find that managerial ownership tends to seriously worsen productivity performance, whilst block holder ownership enhances financial performance. Third, managerial industry experience promotes productivity performance but worsen financial performance. Overall, in the contemporary relationship football firms are characterized by a trade-off effect between financial and productivity performance measures. Finally, I document evidence that productivity performance depends on financial performance and vice-versa.